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SUBSTITUTED DECISION MAKING AND COERCION: THE SOCIALLY 
ACCEPTED PROBLEM IN PSYCHIATRIC PRACTICE AND A CRPD-BASED 
RESPONSE TO THEM 
 




Psychiatry has a long tradition of enforcing ‘care’ within mental health settings, 
through formal and informal coercion, often with little regard to decision-making 
capacity. Despite scant evidence for the effectiveness of coercive interventions and 
the wide variation in their application, indicating structural as opposed to health-driven 
reasons for use, coercive practices continue to be routinely used internationally. This 
is notwithstanding the recovery model of care that is endorsed on a national public 
policy level in many countries. Further, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRPD) and its Committee make plain that the use of practices of coercion 
for those who experience disability, including people who experience psychosocial 
disability, are unacceptable and in breach of their and other international conventions. 
The CRPD is interpreted as demanding an end to coercion, primarily through substitute 
decision-making being replaced with supported decision-making. This critical analysis 
examines the development of coercive practices in psychiatry, how they have become 
embedded as both common and socially acceptable, and approaches that may help to 
reduce their use in light of the CRPD. Models of care where changes have been 
successful in reducing substitute decision-making and promoting supported decision-




The World Health Organisation defines health as, “…a state of complete physical, 
mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity.” (1) 
Health in this context stretches beyond the correction of a physiologically abnormal 
marker, the anatomical correction of a physical abnormality or the support of a person 
to the point of temporary happiness. Health includes and is reliant on the support of 
resilient psychological well-being. Despite this, medicine continues to be increasingly 
specialised (2) with the focus being biological and narrow (3). In the area of 
psychiatry, change over time has not led to a similar degree of subspecialisation (4) 
and there have been some attempts to introduce a more holistic stance, such as 
through adoption of the biopsychosocial model of care (5, 6).  
 
Despite this, many problems faced by people who experience psychosocial disabilities 
create challenges in relation to the delivery of effective support. Endemic poverty, 
substandard housing, disparities as victims of violence, exploitation and abuse (7), 
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discrimination in employment and economic opportunities (8), coercive and 
discriminatory legal and medical treatment (9) and disparities in physical health care 
provided to those who experience mental distress continue. Arguably some of these 
problems occur at the interface of psychiatry, public policy and society, constraining 
psychiatric practice within a context where systemic injustice exists (10). The 
normative societal position, and that of psychiatric practice, minimises the value of 
the voice of those who experience mental distress (11), adding barriers to even 
recognising the extent of problems, including those at the socio-political level, that 
impact negatively on individuals and the support they receive (12).  
 
These problems result in reduced quality and effectiveness of support. The 
consequence of this are inequities and disparities in terms of patient outcomes, 
physical illness, and premature mortality (12, 13). The deprivation of usual legal 
freedoms, such as presumed capacity, violate fundamental human rights, and act to 
deepen these inequities and disparities and make challenging them difficult (14). The 
long-standing power imbalances in psychiatry (15), facilitated through coercive 
practices (16), create a globally established psychiatric normative practise, which is 
critiqued in this paper.  
 
II. THE CALL TO REDRESS THE PROBLEM OF COERCIVE PRACTICE 
 
Both the evidence that coercion is of limited effectiveness and human rights 
imperatives are coalescing to challenge coercive practice. The variation in compulsory 
treatment within the same jurisdiction, between regions and individual psychiatrists 
(9, 17, 18) suggests non-clinical factors drive decision making in relation to the use of 
coercion (18, 19). The evidence for many coercive treatments are weak. Community 
treatment orders, a form of coercive treatment, are an example of this (20). 
Furthermore, the use of coercive treatments are increasingly becoming less accepted 
and more often challenged from the perspective of international human rights 
conventions and bodies (21). This raises the question of how mental health services 
could be configured without elements of legal coercion (17). 
 
A. The CRPD 
 
The CRPD (22) was adopted by the United Nations in 2006 and came into force in 
2008. Importantly, the CRPD does not create any new rights for people with disability 
(including people who experience psychosocial disability) but rather it clarifies the 
application of rights and seeks to protect the rights of persons with disabilities that 
exist in other international treaties (23). These have been described as including: 
dignity, equality, non-discrimination, individual autonomy, fair access to resources and 
support, and full social participation and inclusion (24). Interestingly the CRPD, 
developed with considerable input from those with experience of disability, recognises 
that disability occurs when society does not sufficiently accommodate an impairment 
or, in other words, where ‘various barriers may hinder the full and effective 
participation of persons with impairments in society…’ (14). As Article 1 states: 
 




The purpose of the present Convention is to promote, protect and ensure the full and equal 
enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms by all persons with disabilities, and to 
promote respect for their inherent dignity. 
 
This contrasts with the current biomedical model of disability (25) that sees deficits as 
being within the individual. One of the most contentious provisions of the CRPD is 
Article 12, equal recognition before the law, which entails the right to legal capacity 
(25, 26). Legal capacity involves two strands – legal standing (to hold rights) and legal 
agency (to act on those rights and have them recognised), including specifically in 
relation to fundamental decisions regarding health.  
 
The premise of the CRPD is the contention is that despite a perceived or actual 
impairment in decision-making ability (often referred to as mental capacity), people 
experiencing psychosocial disability maintain the right to legal capacity. No matter 
how impaired a person’s decision-making capability might be, this must not be used 
as justification for denying legal capacity. As an example, consent or rejection of 
medical intervention involves an exercise of legal capacity (27), and this is free of the 
normative value of the decision itself (28). 
 
B. Supported decision making as opposed to substituted decision making in light of 
the CRPD 
 
In 2014, the Committee (29) issued a general comment making it clear that Article 12 
and the right to legal capacity should be interpreted to ban any form of substituted 
decision making (where people make a decision on behalf of another person). This 
radical stand was considered necessary as: “there are ongoing violations found in 
mental health laws across the globe, despite empirical evidence indicating its [forced 
treatment’s] lack of effectiveness and the views of people using mental health systems 
who have experienced deep pain and trauma as a result of forced treatment” (29). 
 
To support coercion within the most commonly based ‘best interests’ framework is an 
example of substitute decision-making and remains non-compliant with the CRPD. The 
act of substituting a decision in the patient’s presumed interest requires an outcome 
that is ‘the good’ in the substituter’s perspective, and this approach by its very nature 
is a tautology. 
 
The CRPD Committee identify that support in the exercise of the right to legal capacity 
requires a paradigm shift in the practice of services - from the approach of substitute 
decision-making that involves the determination and delivery of supports considered 
by others to be in the best interests of individuals to the approach of supported 
decision-making that involves the determination and delivery of supports in accord 
with the will and preferences of individuals.  
 
The interpretation of the CRPD Committee has caused significant debate in the 
literature, with the response by some scholars and clinicians being critical, defending 
the need for coercion (30, 31). Concern has been raised that potentially serious 
adverse consequences could arise from a ‘supported decision-making’ only stance (25, 
32). These consequences are identified as including possible legal (33, 34), social (33), 




and societal impacts. Unintended consequences, such as increased criminalisation (24, 
25), is given as an example of this. It has been argued that to leave persons with 
mental disorder, “...free to destroy their own lives and ruin the lives of their loved 
ones” (35) severely endangers the interests of that person, or others, by blocking 
necessary preventive action, and preventing extra, positive entitlements being 
conferred (24). Others go so far as to say that failure to provide (involuntary) 
treatment in response to the impact of a person’s disability is in conflict with Article 
25 of the CRPD (the right to the highest attainable standard of health (23, 24, 36)) 
and is therefore itself discriminatory (24). Taken as a whole, this view considers that 
the Committee fails to offer adequate guidance on how to resolve situations where 
rights are in conflict (e.g. autonomy versus protection of interests of vulnerable 
persons (14)), where there are conflicts between will and preferences in different 
moments (37), when there is a radical change in a person’s preferences (potentially 
related to psychopathology) (14) or what to do in emergency situations (25). The 
fundamentally ‘supported only’ view is considered by these critics to ignore the realities 
of imminent threats to the safety of a person who is experiencing mental distress, or 
threats to the safety of others around them (24). 
 
As such, there is additional concern that the duty of countries to protect the vulnerable 
is in conflict with the Committee’s interpretation of the CRPD (24, 35, 36).  
 
These rights are, however, automatically granted to every other adult. People are 
allowed to make many poor choices, which may lead to harm to themselves or others. 
This is true of other medical decisions, such as the decision to smoke or refuse a 
cancer curing operation but these choices are not removed from those individuals just 
because of the obvious harm that will occur. 
 
Although the CRPD reflects a rights-based ethic, the underlying basis is deontological. 
This perspective is radically different from a utilitarian position that is focused on 
providing ‘the good’. Such a view necessarily examines the ‘ends’, to support a ‘good’. 
The practice of psychiatry involves some of the most challenging ethical questions in 
medicine and the CRPD highlights key tensions inherent in much clinical practice. As 
a result of the potential issues considered by critics to be a consequence of 
implementing change in accord with the position of the CRPD Committee, there is a 
consistent call for exceptions to the “absolutist” position of the Committee which is in 
“stark contrast” with the reality of current mental health care (30) and is “dramatically 
at odds” with centuries of legal acceptance of involuntary detention and treatment 
(14) where prevailing concepts have been widely considered as reflecting a human 
rights perspective (33). It is thought that the CRPD provisions threaten to “disrupt” 
long-standing approaches to mental health law which negates traditional approaches 
to protection of those without capacity (23) and is contrary to the fundamental 
principles of virtually any sophisticated legal system (24).  
 
Despite the fact that there is no jurisdiction in the world that has legislated the 
‘absolutist’ recommendation of the CRPD, any suggestion that the status quo is the 
best or most appropriate system for the support of those who experience mental 
distress no longer holds up to scrutiny. The current psychiatric system in many parts 
of the world causes harm, at least from some patient’s perspectives, and includes 




powers that do not respect the means of people to make choices for themselves, even 
if they are not considered to be the ‘right’ choice by others (38). 
 
Zinkler (30), a leading psychiatrist and academic who has led a coercion-free 
psychiatric support system, states that changes in mental health practice toward a 
system based only on support, without any resort to the use of coercion, are possible 
and can be operationalised. Under this approach, psychiatric diagnosis and/or any 
other manner of rendering a determination of psychosocial disability, would not lead 
to restrictions of liberty. Rather the task of healthcare professionals would be to 
change the nature of the support provided, to encompass both informal and formal 
support arrangements that enable individuals to make decisions in accord with their 
will and preferences (14). The type and intensity of support required will vary based 
on need in relation to decision-making abilities. For example, those in crisis situations 
may require more support. In such a system, the abolishment of coercive practice 
should not equate to the abandonment of support. So, if a person declines the 
assistance of mental health and social services, it would then be incumbent upon those 
services to be creative in identifying various options that may be more or less 
acceptable to the individual, plus identify and implement effective forms of 
engagement to determine wills and preferences, and develop further individualisation 
of support. One of the keys to supported decision-making will be the provision of 
options in terms of the where, how, when, what, and who of service delivery. For 
example, in terms of where, services could be provided in an environment of the 
individual’s preference such as at home, in a crisis centre or at a friend’s home. 
 
Engendering change by amending the law is, however, difficult and may ultimately 
prove impossible to do in a way that adequately addresses the problems with the 
psychiatric system that exist, at least from the perspective of the CRPD and its 
committee. The CRPD was widely ratified over a decade ago, and every legal 
amendment to mental health law globally since that time falls short of the standard of 
supported decision making as recommended by the Committee. Critique of efforts to 
legislate with the CRPD in mind suggest they are superficial (8), and it is difficult to 
conceptualise what law reform would actually involve to meet the standards of the 
CRPD. Greater effort than simply those of policy makers or government is required. A 
concerted and multisystem international change program is needed to support 
systems and services to convert to more human rights-based models of practice.  
 
C. Alternative models of care: CRPD compliant mental health practice 
 
Successful alternative models of psychiatric practice, involving conceptual changes on 
the meso-level, have been developed. In their systematic review, Lloyd-Evans and 
Johnson (39) note that mental health wards may be “harmful, frightening, 
stigmatising, and socially dislocating”. They suggest that community-based residential 
crisis services can provide a feasible and acceptable alternative to hospital admission 
for some people experiencing acute mental distress. For these to succeed Lloyd-Evans 
and Johnson identify a rapid response to distress and the management of acuity as 
key principles. Specific models, as detailed below provide real-world evidence that 
support can be delivered in a fashion that would be considered CPRD compliant. 
Notably, none of these models arose in response to the CRPD. However, they do act 




as examples of how change, even at this level, can be implemented to work in practice 
and result in dramatic changes to the individual experience of mental health care. 
They also provide a practical counter-argument to those who suggest implementing 
the CRPD as understood by the committee is impossible. Obviously these examples 
exist within a social framework where coercion still exists, as no jurisdiction has yet 
provided for a fully CRPD-compliant system. However, this should not be seen as a 
reason to dismiss them. They are models that provide alternatives, and do not require 
the broader coercive system to enable them to exist. As such they provide a direction 
of travel for jurisdictions to consider more widely.  
 
The Heidenheim Mental Health Service in Germany is an example of a new coercion-
free environment. Since 1995, they have operated an open-door system with no 
seclusion. The use of antipsychotic medication has reduced by more than 40% without 
coercive use (19). A critical element of this service is well trained staff.  
 
Another example is reported by Mezzina (40). Trieste is a sustainable, community-
based system that provides a 24/7 network of walk-in community mental health 
services, where service users are considered guests. The shift of focus is from 
hospitalisation to hospitality. The no-coercion system of support for recovery involves 
the health and welfare systems working together based on a whole-of-life vision. This 
service has led to decreased acute presentations and crises. There are low rates of 
hospitalisation and compulsory treatment rates are less than 10 per 100,000 of 
population, which is internationally admirable (17, 18). Again, they have a strong focus 
on training, motivation, and professional development of staff that facilitates a high 
standard of positive attitudes and skills.  
 
The Soteria project (41) is a third example of innovation in service delivery that is 
aimed at minimising coercion and facilitating supported decision-making, in line with 
the requirements of the CRPD. Designed for those early in the course of psychosis, 
58% of Soteria subjects received antipsychotic medication during the follow-up period, 
and only 19% were continuously maintained on antipsychotic medications. This 
suggests significant recovery for those participants.  
 
One notable reflection from these services is that the lack of coercion and the 
facilitation of supported decision-making appears to result in reductions in medication 
use. Contrary to assumptions in this area and clinical guidelines, the published data is 
inadequate to conclusively evaluate whether long-term antipsychotic medication 
treatment results in better outcomes (42). The fact that coercion is then used to 
compel people to adhere to such treatment regimens provides further support for 
CRPD-compliant models of service delivery.  
 
As these projects show, a CRPD-compliant, recovery-oriented and sustainable 
coercion-free psychiatric environment can be conceptualised and implemented without 
the resultant adverse consequences predicted by some. Whilst all these are currently 
smaller scale projects, they do serve to provide some challenge to the inertia in 
response to recommended legal reforms; and some guidance around 
operationalisation. The CRPD and these exemplar projects provide a fulcrum around 
which social opinion can be levered to support such changes on a national level. It is 




multi-system changes, including shifting social perspectives, psychiatric developments 
in practice as well as legislative reform that will support more extensive reform of 
services in accord with the CRPD recommendations. Further, this approach to change 
does not place the burden for insisting on foundational human rights on those who 
experience psychosocial disability.  
 
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Changing any national and international systems to improve health is a challenging 
task. International human rights instruments and bodies act to articulate basic rights 
and freedoms that every person in the world should have and monitor countries in 
relation to the protection of those rights. In this case it is the CRPD, clarifying that the 
application of existing human rights requires coercive practices (substitute decision-
making) in psychiatry to be abolished and replaced with supported decision making. 
Progressing such change is proving slow, despite over a decade of work from the 
direction set by the CRPD. In examining the international landscape, examples can be 
found of CRPD-compliant services, albeit within jurisdictions that still enable coercion. 
Nonetheless these examples appear to flourish from the development of thoughtful 
training, care systems design and founding principles in line with those of the CRPD. 
These not only function but are also reported to be engendering good outcomes, 
which appear to be sustained over prolonged periods, for people who experience 
psychosocial disability. As such there is both the international legal convention and 
practical examples of how supported decision making and non-coercive practice can 
occur. It is not for individual clinicians, or patients, to enact change alone. As this 
paper identifies, ever increasing travel towards a socio-political climate enabling non 




1. World Health Organization. A state of complete physical mental and social well-
being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity. Constitution of the World 
Health Organization. Basic Documents, Forty-fifth edition, Supplement. 2006. 
2. Cassel CK, Reuben DB. Specialization, subspecialization, and 
subsubspecialization in internal medicine. The New England Journal of Medicine. 
2011;364(12):1169. 
3. Donini-Lenhoff FG, Hedrick HL. Growth of specialization in graduate medical 
education. JAMA. 2000;284(10):1284-9. 
4. Moncrieff J, Crawford MJ. British psychiatry in the 20th century—observations 
from a psychiatric journal. Social science & medicine. 2001;53(3):349-56. 
5. Engel GL. The need for a new medical model: a challenge for biomedicine. 
Holistic Medicine. 1989;4(1):37-53. 
6. Engel GL. The need for a new medical model: a challenge for biomedicine. 
Science. 1977;196(4286):129-36. 
7. Bartlett P. Will and preferences in the overall CRPD project. World Psychiatry. 
2019;18(1):48. 
8. Minkowitz T. CRPD Advocacy by the World Network of Users and Survivors of 
Psychiatry: The Emergence of an User/Survivor Perspective in Human Rights. Available 




at SSRN: https://ssrncom/abstract=2326668 or 
http://dxdoiorg/102139/ssrn2326668. 2012. 
9. Brosnan LJL. Who’s Talking About Us Without Us? A Survivor Research 
Interjection into an Academic Psychiatry Debate on Compulsory Community Treatment 
Orders in Ireland. Laws. 2018;7(4):33. 
10. Fricker M. Epistemic injustice: Power and the ethics of knowing: Oxford 
University Press; 2007. 
11. Crichton P, Carel H, Kidd IJ. Epistemic injustice in psychiatry. BJPsych bulletin. 
2017;41(2):65-70. 
12. Kurs R, Grinshpoon A. Vulnerability of individuals with mental disorders to 
epistemic injustice in both clinical and social domains. Ethics & Behavior. 
2018;28(4):336-46. 
13. Carel H, Kidd IJ. Epistemic injustice in healthcare: a philosophial analysis. 
Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy. 2014;17(4):529-40. 
14. Szmukler G. “Capacity”,“best interests”,“will and preferences” and the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. World Psychiatry. 
2019;18(1):34-41. 
15. Puras D, Gooding P. Mental health and human rights in the 21st century. World 
Psychiatry. 2019;18(1):42. 
16. Drew N, Funk M, Tang S, Lamichhane J, Chávez E, Katontoka S, et al. Human 
rights violations of people with mental and psychosocial disabilities: an unresolved 
global crisis. The Lancet. 2011;378(9803):1664-75. 
17. O’Brien A. Community treatment orders in New Zealand: regional variability and 
international comparisons. NZMJ. 2014;22(4):352-6. 
18. Gordon S, O’Brien A. New Zealand’s mental health legislation needs reform to 
avoid discrimination. NZMJ. 2014;127(1403):55-65. 
19. Zinkler M. Germany without coercive treatment in psychiatry—a 15 month real 
world experience. Laws. 2016;5(1):15-25. 
20. Heun R, Dave S, Rowlands. Little evidence for community treatment orders–a 
battle fought with heavy weapons. BJPsych Bulletin. 2016;40(3):115-8. 
21. Flynn EJ. The rejection of capacity assessments in favor of respect for will and 
preferences: the radical promise of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. World Psychiatry. 2019;18(1):50. 
22. UN General Assembly. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: 
resolution / adopted by the General Assembly, 24 January 2007. 2007. 
23. Appelbaum P. Protecting the rights of persons with disabilities: an international 
convention and its problems. Psychiatric Services. 2016;67(4):366-8. 
24. Dawson J. A Realistic Approach to Assessing Mental Health Laws’ Compliance 
with the UNCRPD. International journal of law and psychiatry. 2015;40:70-9. 
25. Duffy RM, Kelly BD. Rights, laws and tensions: A comparative analysis of the 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the WHO Resource Book on 
Mental Health, Human Rights and Legislation. International journal of law and 
psychiatry. 2017;54:26-35. 
26. Richardson G. Mental disabilities and the law: From substitute to supported 
decision-making? Current legal problems. 2012;65(1):333-54. 
27. Scholten M, Gather J. Adverse consequences of article 12 of the UN Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities for persons with mental disabilities and an 
alternative way forward. Journal of medical ethics. 2018;44(4):226-33. 




28. Newton-Howes G, Pickering N, Young G. Authentic decision-making capacity in 
hard medical cases. Clinical Ethics. 2019:1477750919876248. 
29. UN Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), General 
comment No. 1 (2014), Article 12: Equal recognition before the law, 19 May 2014, 
CRPD/C/GC/1 
30. Zinkler M, von Peter S. End Coercion in Mental Health Services—Toward a System 
Based on Support Only. Laws. 2019;8(3):19. 
31. Freeman MC, Kolappa K, de Almeida JMC, Kleinman A, Makhashvili N, Phakathi 
S, et al. Reversing hard won victories in the name of human rights: a critique of the 
General Comment on Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. The Lancet Psychiatry. 2015;2(9):844-50. 
32. de Almeida JMCJWP. The CRPD Article 12, the limits of reductionist approaches 
to complex issues and the necessary search for compromise. 2019;18(1):46. 
33. Freeman MC, Kolappa K, de Almeida JMC, Kleinman A, Makhashvili N, Phakathi 
S, et al. Reversing hard won victories in the name of human rights: a critique of the 
General Comment on Article 12 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities. World Psychiatry. 2015;2(9):844-50. 
34. Steinert TJ. The UN Committee's interpretation of “will and preferences” can 
violate human rights. World Psychiatry. 2019;18(1):45. 
35. Appelbaum PSJ. Saving the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities–from itself. World psychiatry. 2019;18(1):1. 
36. Szmukler G, Daw R, Callard FJ. Mental health law and the UN Convention on the 
rights of persons with disabilities. International journal of law and psychaitry. 
2014;37(3):245-52. 
37. Galderisi SJ. The UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities: great 
opportunities and dangerous interpretations. World psychiatry. 2019;18(1):47. 
38. Newton-Howes G, Mullen R. Coercion in psychiatric care: Systematic review of 
correlates and themes. Psychiatric services. 2011;.62(5):pp. 
39. Lloyd‐Evans B, Johnson SJ. Community alternatives to inpatient admissions in 
psychiatry. World psychiatry. 2019;18(1):31-3. 
40. Mezzina R. Community mental health care in Trieste and beyond: An “Open 
Door–No Restraint” system of care for recovery and citizenship. Jounral of nervous 
and mental diseases. 2014;202(6):440-5. 
41. Bola JR, Mosher LR. Treatment of acute psychosis without neuroleptics: two-year 
outcomes from the Soteria project. The journal of nervous and mental disoeases. 
2003;191(4):219-29. 
42. Sohler N, Adams BG, Barnes DM, Cohen GH, Prins SJ, Schwartz S. Weighing the 
evidence for harm from long-term treatment with antipsychotic medications: A 
systematic review. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry. 2016;86(5):477-91. 
 
 
 
